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BOOK REVIEW
Environment and Resource Policies for the World Economy.
By Richard N. Cooper. Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1994.
Steve Charnovitz*
In 1992, the Brookings Institution commenced a major project on
"Integrating National Economies" to examine the problems which can
ensue from economic globalization in a world of sovereign nation-
states. The fruit of this project is a 22-volume series. The book re-
viewed here is the environmental volume in that series. It is written by
Richard N. Cooper, then a professor of international economics at
Harvard, and now on leave as the chairman of the U.S. National Intel-
ligence Council. He is a leading scholar of international cooperation.
Cooper begins by pointing out that his book is written within the
context of national sovereignty over natural resources within a coun-
try's border. He notes that territoriality might be questioned at a phil-
osophical level, but points out that national ownership, or individual
ownership within a national system of legal property rights, is long
settled and widely accepted. To demonstrate the continuing salience
of territoriality, Cooper explains that as recently as the 1970s, the
world political community allocated one-fourth of the earth's surface
to nations in the form of 200-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZ).
He reminds the reader that the Nixon Administration had at one time
proposed that off-shore oil be treated as common heritage, but that
coastal states rejected this idea.
So the topic of Cooper's book is not how the denizens of earth
might ideally manage their natural resources. Rather, the book asks a
pragmatic question -- how should sovereign nations cooperate to re-
spond to environmental challenges? When are international agree-
ments necessary? He divides the issues into three categories: (1)
resources open to general use by common agreement; (2) national re-





sources whose use materially affects outsiders through the market
only; and (3) national resources whose use materially affects outsiders
in physical and direct ways.
Cooper notes that our assessment of the adequacy of resources
changes over time with the application of better technology. In his
view, exhaustion of natural resources will not be a problem, even in
the very long run. He declares: "Only two inputs are ultimately re-
quired to satisfy all man's material needs on earth: brainpower and
energy." Cooper sees an ample supply of both, so long as mankind
manages its affairs sensibly. Thus, no distinct international problem
exists regarding the availability of nationally owned resources.
While Cooper's optimism may be warranted regarding non-re-
newable resources (e.g., tin), it seems more questionable regarding re-
newable resources (e.g., fish). Cooper recognizes that renewable
resources can be mismanaged, but does not perceive that as under-
mining his prediction of abundance. Regarding food, for example, he
says that adequate national supplies can be assured through diversify-
ing sources of supply and providing more storage. Regarding biodiver-
sity, Cooper notes that species are becoming extinct, but he does not
see that as a large problem since many species have no value for peo-
ple beyond the aesthetic of knowing they exist. To buttress his point,
he suggests that a nation's biodiversity could be bought by foreigners
who placed more value on it than the local populace does.
Cooper may well be right. But to this reviewer, he seems too will-
ing to ignore potential values that cannot be monetized. He also looks
at biological resources as goods (for which substitutes are always
available) rather than as systems whose resilience can be lost through
careless management.
The first category -- resources open to general use -- has been
called the "common heritage" or the "global commons." This includes
Antarctica, outer space, the deep seabed, and the oceans. Cooper re-
views the international regimes in place and being established to safe-
guard these resources. They can be of two types -- namely, partition
(i.e., allocation of well-defined property rights) and joint manage-
ment. He concludes that current regimes are adequate except for the
living resources of the ocean. (The book does not cover the topic of
ocean pollution).
A key issue regarding the ocean is overfishing. The author notes
that some international conservation regimes have been successful
(e.g., fur seals). But the establishment of the 200-mile EEZ has not
worked out well either in protecting fisheries or in preventing conflict.
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The main problems are (1) that national rights to the EEZ are not the
same as private property rights and (2) that countries have bungled
the management of their EEZs. Cooper does not see much hope of
fixing the current regime. He suggests that aquaculture might be a
solution for maintaining a supply of fish.
Another ocean-related issue is the clash of objectives between
conservation (i.e., efficient harvesting) and preservation. Cooper
points out that the international regime for whales, that is, the Inter-
national Whaling Commission, has declared a ban on the commercial
harvesting of all whales even though certain species could be har-
vested without undermining sustainability. Cooper sees this non-utili-
zation policy as potentially undermining the entire whaling regime.
Yet he does not discuss how to resolve conflicting objectives for com-
mon heritage resources. Why is wise use better than preservation?
Who should decide, if not the Whaling Commission?
The book misses an opportunity to do a systematic analysis of
partition versus joint management. When is one strategy better than
the other? What preconditions exist to make each of them work?
What is the difference between private versus public partition? What
voting rule should be used for joint management? How does partition
relate to the emerging concept of an open, global market?
The next category is national resources whose use materially af-
fects outsiders only through the market. The issue is what multilateral
economic policies are needed to deal with economic activities that
cause no transborder environmental externalities. One option is for
countries to harmonize their environmental standards so that pollut-
ing production does not migrate to countries with low environmental
standards. Cooper rejects, this option for several reasons. First, coun-
tries do not need the same environmental standards in order to
achieve equivalent environmental outcomes. For example, air pollu-
tion in southern Africa may be disbursed by winds. Second, countries
do not need equivalent environmental outcomes. Clean air and water
need to compete with other social goods. Poor nations may want less
clean air in favor of faster development. That is properly a decision
for each country to make, Cooper says.
Cooper also explains that the term "environmental dumping" is
an inapt one to describe exports from a country with low environmen-
tal standards. Assuming that the decisionmaking in the country re-
flects national volitions, then the prices of the exported goods do fully




the term. (Of course, U.S. antidumping laws embrace a more arbitrary
concept of dumping, but that is another issue).
One of the enjoyable aspects of reading commentary by this au-
thor is that he does not pull his punches. According to Cooper, it is
"desirable" to have polluting industries migrate from high-income to
low-income countries. Thus, there is no need for international action
to prevent such migration through harmonization of standards. Many
economists reach the same conclusion, but do so by pointing out that
such migration is not occurring. Cooper is bolder; he believes that
even if it were occurring, the international community should do noth-
ing about it.
Cooper presents this doctrine clearly. But unfortunately, he illus-
trates his point with a bad example: the U.S.-Mexico dispute over tuna
and dolphins. Although some of the tuna fishing by Mexican-flag ves-
sels occurs in Mexico's EEZ, some occurs in areas outside of Mexico's
sovereignty. Moreover, tuna and dolphins migrate. Thus, one cannot
characterize Mexico's actions as having no transborder externalities.
Indeed, since the harvesting occurs in the ocean, one might say that
none of the externalities lie solely within Mexico's area of sovereignty.
Mexico may have "jurisdiction" over its fishing vessels on the high
seas, but not over the fish in the seas.
Cooper recognizes that the tuna-dolphin dispute is an interna-
tional one. If negotiations fail, he thinks that countries ought to be
able to require that labels be affixed to tuna cans, indicating whether
the tuna was caught in an undesirable way. In another bold statement,
he says that the international community "should not be able to force
a country to purchase products the production of which offends the
sensibilities of its citizenry." But import bans of such products could
violate international trade rules, he points out. If so, the importing
country would have to offer compensation to the injured country in
order to retain the import ban.
Cooper does not fully explore the implications of this situation.
Why should countries have to pay to maintain their solicitude for
marine resources? Why should the trade regime give rights to export-
ing nations who must then be compensated by nations that refuse to
import products whose production deteriorates the global commons?
Leaving aside the bad example of the tuna-dolphin dispute, the
viewpoint in this chapter is a coherent one. So long as environmental
externalities are cabined within a country, there is no need for inter-
national standard-setting regarding the method of production. Cooper
acknowledges that governments may not accurately reflect public
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 15:698 (1995)
views about the environment, particularly in authoritarian countries,
but suggests that the solution for that is a push for more democracy,
not a direct push for higher environmental standards.
There is one caveat however. Governments may not act on their
own environmental preferences out of a fear of competition from
lower-standard countries. This scenario does provide a justification for
collective action, Cooper agrees. Whenever countries want to move in
the same direction, harmonizing their actions may avoid short-term
costs to employment, exports and output.
Nevertheless, Cooper explains that this argument tends to be
overutilized. He gives steel production as an example. While countries
may want to act together to reduce pollution in making steel, a better
approach would be for steel production to migrate to a country with
low environmental preferences. In cases like this, more harmonized
national policymaking is not the efficient solution. Each government
can act in its own interest without regard to what other governments
are doing. Thus, situations which involve no transborder environmen-
tal externality are typically not examples of the "prisoner's dilemma"
wherein two players are better off when they cooperate and worse off
when they act alone.
Cooper is analytically correct. But he fails to give sufficient atten-
tion to the problem of domestic "regulatory drag." This occurs when
governments do not set optimal environmental regulations due to
political pressure from industries which would be hurt in world com-
petition. Commodities are a case in point. In the absence of a way to
distinguish a commodity according to the "greenness" of its produc-
tion method, it may be very difficult for governments to dictate
greener methods for commodity production whenever the better stan-
dards entail higher costs.
Another omission in the book is any focus of the connection be-
tween trade policy and environmental policy. Cooper's argument that
international cooperation is not needed to set policy for purely domes-
tic environmental issues applies equally to the setting of trade policy.
Countries can liberalize their trade barriers unilaterally. Nevertheless,
there is an elaborate international regime (now the World Trade Or-
ganization or WTO) to induce cooperation and harmonization in such
liberalization. Cooper is willing to assume that each government pur-
sues environmental policies that are best for the people in that coun-
try. But he is apparently unwilling to make the same assumption
about trade policy, even though the effect on outsiders occurs only




Governments formulate their trade policy to improve (or to
maintain) the competitiveness of national industries and to stimulate
economic growth. It is generally accepted that inter-governmental co-
ordination of the use (and nonuse) of trade policies can lead to more
effective outcomes. By contrast, some economists seem to doubt that
inter-governmental coordination of environmental policies can stimu-
late growth and promote efficiency. Cooper does not explain why
trade coordination is more important than environmental coordina-
tion. Another disappointment is that he does not attempt to draw any
lessons from international monetary cooperation that might be appli-
cable to international environmental cooperation.
The third category covered in the book is national resources
whose use materially affects outsiders beyond the market framework.
The issue is what multilateral policies are needed to deal with activi-
ties that do cause transborder environmental externalities. Such exter-
nalities are often regional in scope. For example, as this review is
being completed (mid-1995), President Chirac has announced that
France will restart nuclear testing on Mururoa Atoll in French Polyne-
sia. Many Pacific nations are upset about this and have suggested that
if Chirac really believes the tests are safe, he should conduct them in
France.
The most serious problems are the global externalities. Cooper's
chapter focuses on climate change. After reviewing the issue of ozone
depletion, Cooper concludes that a serious problem did exist and that
the international community rose to the occasion. The result was the
Montreal Protocol calling for the phase-out of chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs).
Cooper identifies several conditions favorable to the successful
conclusion of a treaty including: the availability of substitutes to
CFCs, the small number of CFC-producing countries and firms, and
the clarity of scientific evidence. He notes that these conditions are
not likely to be in place for other issues, such as global warming. His
book does not discuss any of the lingering problems with the Montreal
Protocol such as trade in CFCs among developing countries.
The issue of global warming occupies a large portion of Cooper's
book. He sees it potentially as a preeminent challenge for interna-
tional cooperation. At present, however, Cooper is not convinced by
the available scientific evidence. To him, the global warming hypothe-
sis is "conjectural since there is little evidence of the predicted warm-
ing over the past century."
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To address global warming, a Framework Convention on Climate
Change was adopted in 1992. The developed countries undertook to
adopt national policies to limit greenhouse gas emissions with the aim
of returning "individually or jointly" to emission levels of 1990. The
developing countries undertook to cooperate only insofar as their full
incremental costs were paid for by developed countries. Today, devel-
oped countries are responsible for about 70 percent of current carbon
dioxide emissions. This will fall to 50 percent or less by the year 2100.
Even today China (a heavy user of coal) is responsible for 11 percent
of annual carbon dioxide emissions.
If the world community were convinced of the danger of green-
house gas emissions, this would call for fundamental changes in indus-
trial, agriculture, and household practices. Some analysts have urged
that such actions begin as soon as possible. But Cooper argues that
responses to a long-term problem like global warming are an invest-
ment that should be weighed against other investments that can be
bequeathed to future generations.
Cooper puts forward two strategies known as "mitigation" and
"adaptation." Mitigation requires taking preventive actions now. Ad-
aptation allows gradual implementation of changes. Compared with
adaptation, mitigation implies a lower world income in the near future
but a higher income in the more distant future. A nation's choice be-
tween mitigation and adaptation is sensitive to the discount rate.
Cooper critiques the global warming analysis of William Cline of the
Institute for International Economics who presumes a discount rate of
2%. Cooper argues that 2% is way too low. Yet even at 2% and as-
suming risk aversion, Cline recommends only a modest mitigation
program now although he points out that a strenuous program might
be needed later. Given our lack of information about the rate of cli-
mate change, Cooper believes that adaptation is more prudent than
mitigation.
If global warming develops into a clearer threat, then a high de-
gree of international attention will be required. Since the cooperation
of industrial and developing countries will be necessary to reduce car-
bon missions, negotiators will face a tough challenge. In Cooper's
view, developing countries are not likely to constrain their economic
growth for the sake of global environmental improvement. At a mini-
mum, they will ask for compensation to pay their incremental costs, as
suggested in the Climate Change Convention. But, as Cooper notes,
they may try to extract even more compensation as the price to secure
their cooperation. This will magnify the challenge to industrial country
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governments, whose task of generating domestic support for lifestyle
changes is already quite difficult.
If carrots won't work, then will sticks? As Cooper explains, the
issue of what to do about free-riders and noncompliers is an inevitable
one. The Montreal Protocol addressed this by providing for trade bans
against nonparties, and these bans (along with the carrot of financial
assistance) appear to have induced countries to join the Protocol.
It would be difficult to utilize this enforcement approach in a cli-
mate change treaty however. The trade bans in the Montreal Protocol
apply narrowly to CFCs and products containing CFCs. For carbon
emissions, there is no obvious trade to target. Banning all trade with a
country will be costly to both parties. In addition, such a trade ban
would be seen by many as a violation for World Trade Organization
rules. Nevertheless, Cooper does not rule out trade bans when they
are part of a package of carrots and sticks.
Cooper also discusses potential mechanisms for reducing carbon
emissions. One approach would be to deny general use of the atmos-
phere for carbon emissions. Producers would be required to secure
emission rights before polluting. The main problem with this approach
is that there is no universally acceptable way to' allocate the initial
rights among countries. Allocation according to current emissions, or
projected emissions, or population can lead to unfairness or perverse
incentives. There would also be difficult enforcement problems since
there is easy access to the atmosphere.
Another approach would be to levy a uniform nationaltax (or a
global tax) on greenhouse gas emissions. Such a tax could reduce
emissions efficiently and generate new revenue for governments (or
the international community) in a way that does not impede work,
saving, or investment. The problem with this approach is political; en-
ergy taxes are unpopular.
Given the scientific uncertainties and the difficulties of securing
cooperation, Cooper recommends a major global research effort. He
says that before being taken seriously for the future, large-scale cli-
mate models should be improved so that they can indicate past climate
change accurately. Based on his analysis of prior episodes of interna-
tional cooperation, Cooper suggests that an international consensus
on the dangers mankind faces is necessary to justify serious, costly
collaboration to avert those dangers.
Overall, this book is informative and well-written. My main criti-
cism is what the book doesn't cover. It omits many of the key issues in
the ongoing "trade and environment" debate. These issues have arisen
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because national sovereignty is not congruent to the challenges of en-
vironmental stewardship.
For instance, does international trade make it more difficult for
governments to mandate cost internalization? Does the increased in-
ternational travel arising from integration alter the concept of purely
domestic pollution? Does international trade in a species (e.g., rhino
horn) transform it into an international issue? When does trade liber-
alization improve the environment and when does it worsen it? Does
economic growth automatically induce better governmental manage-
ment of the environment? Is the WTO principle of national treatment
appropriate for trade in hazardous wastes? Does the WTO principle
of most-favoured-nation conflict with a "common heritage" regime re-
lying upon partition? Should the WTO permit countries to require
eco-labels that relate to the production process (e.g., sustainable for-
est harvesting)? Is a tax rebate upon export inconsistent with the po-
luter-pays principle? Would trade countermeasures ever be
appropriate to punish a country that fails to protect its own resources
(e.g., endangered elephants)? What should the world community do
about illegal traffic in whale meat that undermines the Whaling Treaty
or about traffic in CFCs that undermines the Montreal Protocol? Is
the NAFTA side agreement a good model for the incorporation of the
environment into future trade agreements? Could international envi-
ronmental cooperation be facilitated by creating a new international
institution that might include features from the WTO or the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund?
Because this is the only book in the Brookings series that ad-
dresses the environment in any detail, the absence of discussion re-
garding issues like these is a significant omission. Still, the volume by
Cooper is informative. It will be especially useful to readers seeking to
understand our most pressing environmental challenges as seen from
an economics perspective.
